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Conrad Sarah-Jane, Cassidy Claire, Mathis Christian 
 
Abstract 
Children are considered not to be full members of society and that their participation 
should be limited. Further, that this limitation is imposed by adults.  In order to counter ǯ
some way. Philosophy with Children, in all its variety of approaches and practices, lays 
claim to being a tool that allows children to develop the skills necessary for citizenship 
such as participation and airing their views. This chapter focuses on the role of 
Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI), a specific method of practical Philosophy 
with Children, to empower children and give them a voice. CoPI has a series of 
distinctive features that makes it especially apt in meeting this goal.  Children are able to 
articulate their views on a particular topic and this is supported by the structure of the 
dialogue itself. In addition, their statements must build on previous statements by 
demonstrating dis/agreement and the participants must provide reasons to justify that ȀǤǯ
and the facilitator works to juxtapose speakers in order to drive the dialogue further 
philosophically. In this chapter, these features of CoPI are illustrated by examples from 
dialogues on the Good Life, stimulated by the question "What kind of society would you 
like to live in?" CoPI is shown to give children voice with a view to promoting their 
participation in society while also eschewing the imbalance in the adult/child power 
relationship as questions regarding the good life ultimately invite us to reconsider our 
views of children. 
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1. Children and the Good Life 
 
1.1 Two perspectives on the good life 
 
Children have an interest in a good life that is a life that is happy, healthy, emotionally 
and intellectually satisfying, safe and meaningful and so forth. Two perspectives can be 
distinguished within these different features that constitute a good life (Steinfath, 1998, 
Fenner, 2007, Krebs, 1998). A first perspective relates to the subjective dimension of a 
good life and defines it in terms of what an individual takes to be good for her/himself. 
This, in return, depends on how an individual conceives of pleasures, preferences, 
desires and interests. Because of the close link to an individualǯs preferences and desires, 
the lifestyle choices of a particular person may not have the same value for somebody 
else and we therefore can only give prudential answers to the question ǲ
constitutes a good lifeǫǳ. As the question considers only general features of the good life 
for the on who lives it. However, we may say very generally that a good life in this 
subjective perspective is one that a person addresses in positive terms and that he 
values (Fenner, 2007). The second perspective focuses on the requirements necessary 
for everyone to strive for a good life and to have, in principle, access to the above 
 2 
mentioned features (Steinfath, 1998). Within the second perspective the concept of a 
good life is given a more objective reading by considering the conditions of a good life 
for everybody. When addressing these conditions, we inevitably coin the concept 
ethically and politically as we encounter issues of morality and justice. 
The question, while discussed, is controversial if the two dimensions are both part and 
parcel of the concept of a good life and, further, if they are related (Fenner, 2007; 
Aristotle, 2000). Wolf (1997) indicates that within the subjective perspective a good life 
is considered to be a happy and a meaningful life and she argues that neither of these 
terms describes exclusively individual preferences. She therefore counters the view of 
radical subjectivism and sees the subjective and objective perspective intimately linked. 
It has also been suggested that the two perspectives can be interlinked as both 
perspectives lay emphasis on autonomy (Krebs, 1993). The first perspective conceives of ǯ freely a specific way to live 
that s/he considers to be good. The second perspective takes autonomy to be the type of 
good that has to be guaranteed to everyone in order for a person to strive and attain an 
autonomous good life in the subjective sense. Nussbaum (2000, 2006, 2011) is very 
explicit on this point and she takes a theory of social justice to define the requirements 
for a good life, which she formulates in terms of the central capabilities. Capabilities are 
derived from the innate abilities human beings have and they deliver an answer to the  ǲ   erson able to    ǫǳ ȋǡ  ? ? ? ?Ȍ. The term Ǯǯ hence denotes what a person is capable of being and doing. Nussbaum 
distinguishes altogether ten aspects central for a good life that relate to life, bodily 
health, integrity of the health, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical 
reasons, affiliation, other species, play, and ǯ. With regard 
to the capability of practical rea    ǯ ǡ 
points out that a good life requires that a person can form a conception of the good and          ǯ     
participate effectively in political choices that govern life (Nussbaum, 2000, 2011). 
Obviously, the list of capabilities Nussbaum mentions is not restricted to basic needs for 
survival such as food, shelter and primary health care. To the contrary: Nussbaum seeks 
to integrate all aspects that form a human life in the full sense of the term and we can 
derive from the list of central human capabilities what is essential to a good life. Central 
human capabilities in return give rise to social and political duties. According to 
Nussbaum, the core role of political organizations within a society is to provide support 
for the development of those capabilities so a person can choose freely and 
autonomously a life according to his/her preferences and desires. The core duty of 
society and politics is to guarantee everybody autonomy so that everyone has the 
possibility and the opportunity to live an autonomous life; and this is where the 
subjective and the objective perspective come together. 
 
1.2 Children in our society 
 
It is a generally acknowledged that children are considered not to be full members of 
society and that their participation is limited (Friquenon, 1997; Mayall, 2007; Qvortrup 
2006, 2007). This raises the question to what extent they are taken into account by 
theories of social justice and theories of the good life. We notice that very little is found 
in contemporary theories of social (Bojer, 2005). Within a Rawlsian framework, for 
example, children are explicitly excluded from engaging in a social contract that 
determines social justice. Rawls justifies this exclusion by arguing that children do not 
possess the rationality required to engage in the discussions for establishing a social 
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contract (Rawls, 1971). ǯcapabilities approach seems to apply only partially 
to children, too. Even though Nussbaum explicitly states that the development in early 
childhood unites all human beings through shared experiences of common emotions 
such as sadness, love and anger (Nussbaum, 1999), she also claims that children do not 
deploy the above mentioned capabilities of practical thinking or controlling ǯ
environment that are considered central for forming a conception of the good and 
participating in political choices that govern life. If we take, as Nussbaum suggests, that 
capabilities define what is essential to a good life, the fact that children have not full 
access to some of them ultimately amounts to saying that they do not (yet) have a good 
life. This conclusion is puzzling and outright unacceptable given that both adults and 
children are, in the first place, human being and justice claims hold for both. It raises the 
question of whether the list of capabilities must be revised or extended in order to suit 
the specific nature or category of children or if ǯ view of children must be 
changed in light of the human capabilities that count equally for everyone, regardless of 
age, sex, social background, talents, etc. In any case, we have to find clear answers to the ǲǫǳ. 
We delay answering this particular question as despite the deficits within the two 
predominant theories of social justice, consideration of children has moved on greatly in 
recent years, partly due to the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC) in 1989. The UNCRC states that children require special attention to 
ensure their protection, provision and participation. Participation is associated with the ǯ and giving them the opportunity to express their views freely in 
matters concerning them, to being heard and to seek information pertinent to their lives 
(UNCRC Article 12, 13). While voice and participation is high on the agenda of the 
UNCRC, the implementation of the respective rights still leaves much to be desired. In 
many areas, children are still not permitted to engage fully or express their views even 
on questions that have considerable impact on their lives or concern them directly 
(Lundy, 2007; Cassidy 2012d). Hence, in theory and practice, ǯ
limited and we therefore seriously fail children. Empowerment of children therefore still 
figures among the core duties societies and political institutions must take u. 
To begin with, we need a better understanding of the shortcomings children encounter 
in society. It seems worthwhile to have a look at how society views children and see the 
possibilities and opportunities that are presented to them. By identifying the deficits, we 
can formulate possible remedies to counterbalance them. In what follows, we first delve 
in the philosophy of child in order to identify possible obstacles to a fully-fledged 
realization of social justice issues as well as the implementation of the UNCRC. The basis 
of the present and prevailing philosophy of child is therefore briefly outlined in the next 
chapter. It shows the desperate need to empower children because of the adult/child 
divide that implies a striking disempowerment of children (Part 2). It then is claimed 
that Philosophy with Children (PwC) and in particular the method of Community of 
Philosophical Inquiry, in short CoPI, offers a view on children that allows us to 
counterbalance the deficit taken upon children by giving them an active role and the 
possibility to partake and influence the community into which they are integrated (Part 
3). CoPI provides by this insights into the views and opinions children have. We then 
turn to the ǯ ǡa collected in Scotland in 2014 
using Community of Philosophical Inquiry as a research tool. Children were asked to    Ǯ         ǫǯ  express their 
views upon the subject. (Part 4). Within the concluding remarks we finally address the 
question of possible recommendations needed to counterbalance the adult/child divide 




2. From the Philosophy ǥ 
 
One key factor that demands attention if children are to be empowered is around how 
they are perceived, and also treated, in society.  In this statement alone one sees part of 
the problem Ȃ Ǯǯby others.  These others tend to 
be adults since it is adults that currently hold the power in any dynamic between them 
and children in virtually any setting or context one could mention. Adults make the 
decisions, adults act, adults set the parameters in which children live, they with-/hold 
the money (economic resources), and adults impose sanctions on children when they do 
not do as is required of them or when they try to do what is not permitted by them. 
Children are perceived as being qualitatively different to adults (Kennedy, 1992, 2003, 
2006; Cassidy, 2007; Stables, 2008). This is because childhood is seen as a time when 
children are being prepared for their role in society; it is a time for training, when they 
will be permitted to participate as full members of society (Shamgar-Handelman, 1994; 
Friquenon, 1997; Mayall, 2007).  Of course, the view of children has varied over time 
due to possible social, cultural and political shifts (Cunningham, 2006; Heywood, 2011), 
but altogether a deficit model prevails that undermines equality claim with regard to 
children. 
Holding such a deficit model of children permits the retention of the status quo where      ǯ Ǥ It might be suggested that this situation is 
perpetuated as adults want to protect children, and they do this on the basis of their 
more expanded Ǯ ǯǤ Lack of life experience undeniably creates a certain 
amount of vulnerability, yet, it is important to see ǯis to a 
certain extent a result of the power adults exert upon their lives. For example, adults 
define what they take to be suitable behavioural norms for children, or adults create 
private and public spaces that mainly reflect their needs, supplemented by explicit and 
implicit rules defining appropriate behaviour in these places that often only marginally ǯperspective on them but rely on the adultsǯ expectations 
Along with this expectation we find the means for sanctions on the adultsǯ , while 
children are denied any effective means to sanction adults, thus corroborating the 
power imbalance and the divide between child and adult, where children occupy a 
subjugated position (Cassidy, 2006). To this one may add, as Cook (2009) argues, that ǯ
memories of their own childhood, however true or false, a time of innocence without 
worry or care it actually was. Interestingly enough, children seem at moments to 
counterbalance this position in power by establishing their own social contract that tells 
them to play the role of children as determined by adults (Cassidy, 2007). 
In any case, it allows children always to be in a state of becoming. They have no locus in 
the (adult) world, they have limited power or opportunity to make decisions or have 
their voices heard in relation to the wider issues of the day. This ultimately means that 
they have even less at their disposal by way of enacting any of their views, particularly 
were they to run counter to the dominant adult perspective. Unless challenged, and 
unless children are empowered in some way, their voices and opportunities for 
authentic participation are stunted.   
To redress the power imbalance, to afford children, at the very least, what Griffiths calls Ǯǯȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ?Ȍǡ
to effect and/or enact change, then adults must acknowledge the need to shift power 
and then actually     Ǯ    
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children, so their participation is not an add-ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
children are able to participate by virtue of being included in society more fully. It would 
not make sense to say that they could participate without an element of induction or 
training. What needs to be found is an effective means to counterbalance the view that 





One approach that can usefully be employed in bridging this divide between non-
participation and empowerment is Philosophy with Children (PwC). PwC, in all its 
variety of approaches and practices, lays claim to being a tool that allows children to 
develop the skills necessary for participation and airing their views. 
PwC emerged in the 1970s following the work of Matthew Lipman and Ann Sharp in the 
United States where they devised a Philosophy for Children (P4C) programme designed 
to promote critical thinking (Lipman, 2003; Pardales & Girod, 2006; Gregory 2008). 
Critical thinking, simply put, involves judgements based on criteria or reasons. It 
thereby lays the basis for any type of informed decision-making that requires the 
capacity to evaluate facts and relate them to eventual normative stances, be they social, 
moral or political in nature (Bleisch & Huppenbauer, 2011).  
Subsequent to Lipman and Sharpǯs programme, the literature on PwC has been fuelled 
by a variety of approaches and methods all around the world (e.g. Matthews, 1980; 
McCall, 1991, 2009; Cam, 1995; Cleghorn, 2002; Fisher, 2005, 2008). Despite eventual 
differences, all the approaches consider PwC first and foremost as a practical 
philosophical dialogue where children are invited to engage in a structured discussion of 
philosophical ideas and to scrutinize their conceptual and logical implications. Thus, 
PwC allows learning something about philosophy through doing philosophy and the 
different philosophical theses defended through the course of time by different Ǯǯ philosophers play altogether a subordinate role. It is considered more 
important that children learn to think for themselves. By this, PwC takes children to be 
capable of participating in philosophical discussions, formulating their conception on 
different issues and reflecting them critically, a capacity that some believe children fail 
to have (White, 1992) or have only in a restrained way (see above). 
 
 
3.1 Community of Philosophical Inquiry 
 
From ǯ  ?grew  ǯ Community of Philosophical Inquiry (CoPI) 
(McCall, 1991; 2009). CoPI is a structured dialogue, facilitated by a trained Ȁ       ǡ Ǯǯ Ǥ  
simply, the philosophical dialogue within CoPI is brought about as a consequence of the 
structure, with the structure remaining constant, no matter the age or experience of the 
participants (Cassidy, 2007).  Participants sit in a circle in order to see one another and 
to be seen; they read aloud a stimulus that holds philosophical potential; they raise 
questions from the reading, though not necessarily about the text; the facilitator records 
the question and then chooses one to be discussed by the participants.  The participants 
must then raise a hand should they wish to contribute and when called, though not 
necessarily in the order in which they raised their hand, must make a connection with 
something stated previously by saying with whom they agree/disagree and providing 
reasons for that agreement/disagreement.  Contributions need not be the personal 
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views or opinions of the speaker, participants may not make reference to authorities for 
their reasons, no technical language or jargon may be used, and there is no search for 
consensus or conclusion at the end of a session, in order that the participants recognise 
the need to keep thinking about the issue (Cassidy, 2012b).  Essentially, CoPI aims to be 
egalitarian in nature.   
Individual participants sit equidistant to one another; thereby no-one is set apart or in a 
position of power. The one exception is the facilitator, but this is in order that s/he can 
see the participants fully and to ensure that contributions are not channelled to or 
through her/him; the facilitator intervenes only in a quest for further clarification and in ǯ
the most philosophical direction possible (Cassidy, 2012b). Given that no-one may use a 
term or word that is likely not to be known or understood by the others without 
challenge or explanation there is an equalising factor at play. All should be able to 
understand and make oneself understood.  Each participant is equally entitled to speak.  
While all contributions are valued, since one contribution must, by necessity, build on 
previous contribution(s), not all are equally valid. This is not a problem. Indeed, it 
appropriately mirrors how things are in the wider world, where views are expressed 
and extended or diminish and fail. The key in CoPI is that all are permitted to air their 
views and to practise their reason-giving. It is this that is crucial in empowering children. 
 
3.2 Empowering children by doing philosophy 
 
Children have few real opportunities to experiment with their views, to try out their 
reasoning, to be listened to and to have their views considered carefully.  CoPI provides 
this; for in order to participate, or for CoPI to work at all, it demands that a community is 
established where all have equal standing and where ideas are freely exchanged 
(Cassidy, 2012c).  Indeed, the notion of community is an important one, one where 
everyone is required in order for it to function effectively, where individuals have to 
collaborate to achieve a shared common goal (Cassidy & Christie, 2013).  In the case of 
CoPI, the shared common goal is in the shared search for meaning and understanding, in 
the shared construction and perpetuation of a shared line of reasoning. In CoPI, through 
this collaboration, children learn to challenge and be challenged in their thinking, but 
they are given a structure in which they can do so.  Indeed, the structure is transferable, 
with participants reporting that they often carry it into their lives beyond the classroom 
(Ca Ƭ ǡ  ? ? ? ?ȌǤ          ǯ
perspectives and the recognition that this is important in living with others.  Giving 
children the opportunity to experiment with ideas in a manner denied many adults, 
enhan           ǯ 
(Cassidy, 2012c).  It is this space for speaking about ideas that enables the child Ȃ or 
even the adult participant Ȃ to realise their opportunities for articulation.  This is the 
practice-ground where children Ȃ and adults Ȃ train and continue to practise their 
thinking and reasoning.  PwC in general and CoPI in particular enables individuals to 
think for themselves in collaboration with others and it allows everybody to participate 
in the dialogue through deliberation and critical reasoning that lead to reasonable 
judgements.  
Affording children the opportunity to practise CoPI facilitates their engagement with the 
world around them; it provides space to consider questions and issues that require 
attention in society.  Being able to reflect on complex ideas, to see problems and 
solutions in conjunction with others, and to accept the need for such thinking can only 
be of benefit to society.  The practice knows no bar in terms of age. It would be untrue to 
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say that all adults are empowered or enfranchised because they think well. Indeed, 
many adults do not think well though have the tools and structures at their disposal to 
participate fully within society. CoPI allows us to question the particular status that 
adults defend for themselves, too as it incorporates the epistemic stance that everyone is 
fallible, adults and children alike (McCall, 2009). Adultsǯ opinions therefore reflect no 
privileged point of view and they are as open to criticism as any other opinion and may 
be therefore rejected if good reasons can be provided. Eventual power structures are 
overcome in CoPI by the power of reasoning. 
There is a case to suggest that children are introduced to CoPI early in their lives, but 
that the practice is continued, thereby empowering society and the individuals within it.  
By inducting children into good thinking practices then they are empowered, if, and only 
if, they are given a proper space, that their views are listened to and that they have 
impact (Lundy, 2007). This, in turn, allows that children are more than mere becomings. 
This affords them the opportunity to be. 
 
 
4. The Good Life 
  ? ? ? ?ǲ
ǳ
across the country in very different socio-economic areas, i.e. extreme socio-economic 
deprivation and middle-class rural settings. Different parts of the society geographically 
and in terms of social class are thus represented in the data. Seven groups from four 
primary schools and three secondary schools with altogether more than 130 children ǮǫǯCoPI as the method ǯ. This allowed wide-
ranging perspectives to be shared and discussed at length in sessions running over a 
minimum of thirty-five minutes and maximum of one hour, with the time being 
determined only by the class timetable rather than the ages of the children.  
The different groups, all engaged in CoPI sessions on a regular base, discussed a broad 
range of topics such as wellbeing, relationships between people, education, money, 
discrimination, tolerance, companies, media, exploitation, the right to privacy, equality, 
freedom of choice, charity, etc. and thus picked up several strands traditionally 
associated with the concept of good life. The individual groups did not explore each and 
every one of these topics, but having fun, relationships of an individual to other people, 
equality, and money were recurring topics in most of the groups. We provide below a 
small sample of illustrative quotations to highlight some of the key themes that emerged 
within the observed sessions. 
 
4.1 The subjective and objective perspectives of the Good life 
 
These different topics were addressed in a way that allows associating them with the 
two perspectives distinguished at the beginning of the paper, namely the subjective and 
the objective dimension attaining to the concept of a good life. The subjective 
perspective was for example addressed when children in a Primary 2/3 aged 6-7 years 
discussed places they would like to live in, for example ǲ   ǡ 
usually in Lochside there is a lot of noise because when I went in to go with my Gran 
there wa        ǳ ȋFingal1, Treefield Primary) or ǲOh yes 
                                                        
1 All names of the children, the schools and some references to names in the citations 
have been changed in order go guarantee anonymity. 
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ǡ  ǯ            
every day Ȃ         ǥǳ ȋFib, Treefield Primary). 
These statements express personal desires and preferences regarding places to live in. 
The subjective dimension can be found in the following statements from a Primary four 
(eight year-olds), too: ǲwith Dale and Samuel because a tropical paradise is really 
good because you could have a hot tub and everything and cocktails so everybody would    ǳ ȋJed, Glenwood Primary). This statement describes particular f 
characteristics the boy would like to find in the society he would want to live in such as ǮǯǮǯ. Even though other children may share a particular view, 
objections regarding the different features mentioned do not entail any contradiction 
that has to be further addressed, as the preference are purely subjective.  
Subjective statements as the ones above were more often found amongst the very young 
children, though this is not to suggest it was their only focus. When children from 
Primary 3/4 (aged seven and eight) were talking about the importance of having ǲfunǳ 
or ǲa great timeǳ or being ǲhappyǳ        ǲ 
with Dale because I would make it [society] really good, so everyone could have a great ǳ ȋǡ 
 Ȍ, they often implied that an individual is entitled to 
these and that the features alluded to were indispensable for a good society which has 
the duty to guarantee happiness and fun to everybody. The statements thus move at the 
fringe between the subjective and the objective perspective concepts of the good life. ǡ        ǯ  explicitly refer to the 
objective perspective within the concept of good life. This has probably to do with the 
wording of the opening question Ǯǫǯ
which the children were invited to reflect on society generally.  
 
4.2 Attitudes and Relationships 
 
In responding to this question the children laid emphasis on the attitudes people should 
have towards each other and suggested ways in which people should treat one other as ǣǲBecky Ǯ    ǡ   ǯ  ǯ   ey are, they just say ǲǫǳ and 
you would say ǲǳǳ ȋǡȌǡǲ     ǡ         ǳǤ
(Rosanna, Stonefield Primary). Being friendly and kind, respecting and helping each 
other were considered crucial. Respect and care are in fact two central concepts in many 
ethical theories, some even believe them to be the essence of morality and providing the 
foundation of all other moral duties and obligations. The pupils also talked about    ǣ ǲ       
society ǥǳǤȋBert, Dykefell Secondary) 
Moreover, the pupils in this dialogue suggested that a country should exclude people 
that inflict harm intentionally: ǲǳ
(Becky, Bayside Primary) and described a good society in the following way: ǲǯ ǳ
(Rick, Stonefield Primary). The concept of harm is, again, central in morality.  
Underlying many of these statements we find reflected the golden rule that was referred 
to explicitly by a girl in one ǲǥǯe fair to people and treat ǳȋCarla, Dykefell Secondary).  
While talking about these different attitudes and the form of interactions that should 
shape society, different groups were discussing if a good society was possible at all ǲ
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ǯǳȋǡ
Stonefield Primary) or if it were at risk of being boring: ǲǥ    
nice or if people were all really nasty and each other, people become bored so I think 
you need a balance [of good and bad]ǳȋRay, Daleside Secondary). 
 
4.3 Justice and equality 
 
While the very young children focussed, in the dialogues we observed, on topics such as 
friendship and other relationships they entertain (parents, siblings, grandparents, 
teachers), the circle of people considered grew considerably and with this came issues of 
morality and justice that were explicitly addressed in at least five of the seven sessions. 
Statements that lay emphasis on equality can be found in recordings from children in 
primary and secondary schools alike: ǲ ǯ    sǡ ǯ  ǡǯǳǤ ȋVerity, Dykefell Secondary),  ǲ  ǯ           ǡ            ǥǳ
(Verity, Dykefell Secondary), ǲsociety where there is no 
superior group, where everyone can still be equal, there is no subtle racists or ǳȋSallie, Dykefell Secondary). The 
topic of justice, equality and equality of opportunity are taken to hold a society together, 
and the childrens discourse reflects in many instances modern and democracy and 
principle of humanism. 
Some pupils suggested that the society should provide each person with the means 
necessary for obtaining welfare and fairness ǲǥ also suit ǯ  ǳ ȋMasha, Highfield Secondary), and that the government has a ǣǲǡld be equal ... 
the Government should get everybody a job but you get a certain amount of money 
depending upon the job...ǳ (Penelope, Dykefell Secondary). These statements again, 
relate to ideas underlying the theories of social justice presented at the beginning of the 
paper and they make clear that the pupils are well aware that specific conditions need to 
be fulfilled in order to guarantee everybody a good life, which, in turn, endows duties 
onto the society and the state. If these duties hold unconditionally or should be 
restrained to people with special needs was a question debated in several groups. While 
fairness and equality were considered important, other children suggested that they 
were not the only principles that matter within a society ǲuse people should be 
equal, but the people that are rich worked for their money, like they worked really hard          ǥǳ ȋCharlotte, Dykefell Secondary). 
Individual effort should be recognized. Similarly, qualifications people have should be 
rewarded: ǲ ǯ     
that has worked hard and gone to uni[versity] and studied so much to become a doctor ǯǡǯ. Sǯeally, really hard to          ǯ          ǡ  ǯ  ǯ   ǯ   ǳ (Gina, Daleside 
Secondary). If merits and qualification lead to inequalities, this was still considered fair ǲǯ  Ǯǯǯǳ (Gina, Daleside Secondary). 
The pupil thereby referrs to the principle of liberal neutrality that requires governments      ǯ Ǥ This is corroborated in statements such as ǲI ǯǡǯ have to worry about them, you should worry about yourself and yourself 
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  ǳ ȋJuliana, Daleside Secondary). These statements counterbalance the 
responsibility            ǯ
responsibility. The role of the individual with respect to the society was controversially 
discussed in many groups and which lead to discussions around companies and 
individuals that exploit and commit fraud Ƿ         
which they [companies] can just exploit and take money off poor people so they can get ǡǯǡǡǯ
point ǳǤ 
In discussing issues around justice and equality, three groups introduced the thought ǲǳǲǯǳ (Johan, 
Glennwood), and talked about ǲFree Countryǳ and ǲFree Landǳ respectively by one 
group. One of the pupils who introduced the thought experiment in Secondary school ǲǳǡǲ
will separate people from poor people to rich ǳȋPenelope, Dykefell 
Secondary). The very possibility as well as the consequences of this scenario was 
intensively discussed and rejected by some ǲ  ǯ     ǯany money, and there would be no point in ǯǳȋEvelyn, Glenwood Primary), while others approved 
of ǲǤǤǤǳȋMik, Highfield Secondary). 
 
 
5. From philosophy with children to a good life for children 
 
This brief overview of some of the main topics occurring in the different CoPI sessions 
shows that children between the ages of six and seventeen have very differentiated 
views about the world in which they live. If given the opportunity, children critically 
reflect the role of society, the state and the government as well as the individual and 
pick up many strands scattered around the concept of good life. Altogether, the children 
from primary school take on a very political stance with regard to the subject and 
display their ability to participate effectively in (political) discussions and philosophical 
debates on issues that govern their life. CoPI provides children with a genuine space to 
try out ideas and to practise their reasoning about these ideas. The space, and the 
dialogue, crucially, is owned by the children and shows what children are capable of 
being and doing. This space and the experimenting with ideas and development of 
critical thinking is obviously vital within democracy as the children learn to ask question 
and not to take what they hear at face value, to enable them to and imagine situations 
different from and for themselves. The possibility of criticising entrenched structures 
can furthermore lead the children to associate great importance to the task of thinking 
and reason (Nussbaum, 2010). This is perhaps the first step in supporting these children 
in airing views that may subsequently bear fruit in terms of empowering them to action 
and should be given special attention when the capability approach is considered in the 
context of education, as it has been suggested more recently (Walker and Unterhalter, 
2007; Hinchcliff et al. 2009).  
The children all had views on what kind of society they want to live in, yet they have no 
authentic means of expressing this in the wider world and even less to have it effect 
change. In most of the dialogues the children discussed society as it is and the subject 
was addressed in relation to issues that stem from the adultsǯ world such as working in 
order to receive an income and raising a family, taking up loans, getting Government 
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social security benefits, paying taxes, and so on. From this fact we can see that children 
have views about society but we may also infer that the children participating in the 
different CoPI sessions see society as being managed and organised by adults and that 
they lack an awareness of their own voice and participation; that in effect, they are not 
empowered members of the society they discuss. Indeed, this may suggest that they 
themselves have not thought to challenge the hierarchy established by adults and Ǯǯociety.  
Securing for every child the flowering of present and the development of future 
capabilities means that children must be provided with the opportunity to discuss their 
views and practise participating in a community via dialogue in order to assume their 
role as citizens in the society they live. In the same way that the children were asked 
about their view on the good life, CoPI can provide them with opportunities to discuss 
the question if and how children should participate in society and if they should be given 
more control over their environment, be that in terms of enfranchisement or otherwise, 
by this they may also begin to ask on what grounds the participation is denied to them 
and why many equality claim seem to make a full stop before them. For the older 
children that have participated in the project overcoming major obstacles to their 
participation may be nearer than in any other country in the world, since in September 
2014 all those aged sixteen years and older will be enfranchised in the Scottish 
Independence Referendum. As an aside, though, it is worth noting that this unique 
situation will become even more interesting following the Referendum when it has to be 
determined whether Scottish children, over the age of sixteen, receive full 





Questions regarding the good life invite us to consider our view of children substantially. 
Philosophy with Children in general and the method of Community of Philosophical 
Inquiry in particular has been shown to have an impact on the philosophy of child, by 
giving children a voice and promoting their participation in society. It allows children to 
develop the ability to take up their place in a community while also eschewing the 
imbalance in the adult/child power relationship. In the first instance, it provides a 
platform owned by the children where they are able to raise issues they deem important 
or significant.  They are able to undertake this task in a structured setting that enables 
all voices and views to be heard and arguments to be rehearsed.  All comments are open 
to scrutiny and challenge; weak arguments will flounder.  It is not sufficient, though, to 
provide only a forum for discussion, though this is crucial for the generation of a 
thinking society, the crucial factor is in enabling the voices to be heard and to be taken 
into account.  This would entail more children being able to participate in such dialogues, 
in a range of settings.  Schools are easy to use as all children attend these, though other       ǡ   ǯ    
community groups that would reach out to all children.  Those in power (adults) should 
be able to hear the views of children, and this is challenging as it seems to retain the 
notion that adults are permitting children to air their views but only adults will act on 
the views if, and only if, they deem it appropriate to do so.  In order for a meaningful 
shift in the power relationships between children and adults, and that ǯ
are heard and acted upon by whoever is most well-placed to act (be they children or ȌǡǯǤ  ǡ
the likes of lowering the age of political enfranchisement or suffrage is one way to begin 
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this.  Our project shows that children have views about society, some more considered 
than others, but this is the same for adults.  With opportunities for politically and 
morally focused dialogue through the likes of CoPI we might be assured that the 
electorate Ȃ whatever their age Ȃ has critically reflected, as Nussbaum would desire, and 
that the views they air, the votes they cast, the acts they perform are measured and 
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